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The European Commission has apparently backed off from a proposal to 
tax imported goods produced by methods that generate excessive green-
house gas emissions.2 So the issue of whether such a tax would be legal 
under the WTO has become slightly less urgent than it recently appeared. 
But Pascal Lamy the Director-General of the WTO still thought the 
possibility of some countries imposing emission-based trade restrictions 
was worth mentioning prominently in his speech to the Trade Ministers 
Conference in conjunction with the Bali Conference on climate change 
after Kyoto.3 And at that same conference, an official of the European 
Commission may have indicated that such restrictions are not off the 
table entirely.4 Clearly, the impetus for such a tax to be levied by some 
nation or other is not going to go away until we have a universally 
accepted international regime for emissions control - which is to say, 
not any time soon. 
Of course, as Lamy notes, there are all sorts of reasons to prefer a 
multilateral solution to the climate problem. Unilateral import restric-
tions based on emissions will be deeply resented by exporting countries. 
Unilateral restrictions are also likely to disrupt the economy of the 
importing country, if its supply chains and production have been globa-
lised. Unilateral restrictions cannot in any event fully address the 
problem of high-emissions production when the products are sold in 
1 William W. Bishop, Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, 
University of Michigan. I thank Ted Parson for discussion of a draft, and my commenta-
tors Jacques Bourgeois and Daniel Crosby. 
2 A. Bounds, 'EU turns away from carbon tax on imports', Financial Times, 26 November 
2007. 
3 From the WTO website, www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppLe/sppl83_e.htm 
4 ICTSD, 'Trade ministers discuss links between commerce and climate change in Bali', 
Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 11, No. 43 (2007). 
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third-country markets (or in the home market of the high-emissions 
exporting country itself). Nor can they fully address the problem of 
investment capital flowing to high-emission countries. But it is one 
thing to say that we would prefer a universal or widespread international 
agreement. It is quite another to reach such an agreement. Until we do, 
unilateral action will have its proponents. 
It might be suggested that no country will impose emissions-related 
import restrictions, for the same reasons that the EU never used more 
than a fraction of its authorisation for US$ 4 billion of trade sanctions 
against the US after it prevailed in the FSC (United States - Tax 
Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations') litigation.5 This may be too 
sanguine; the cases are different in important respects. If we ask why the 
EU did not impose the authorised sanctions, a number of reasons come 
to mind. (1) Doing so would have greatly embarrassed general political 
and economic relations between the EU and the US. (2) There would 
have been great disruption to EU producers because of the interdepen-
dence of global production. (3) From a national welfare point of view, 
sanctions, which are just protective tariffs under a special permission, 
would hurt the EU economy overall more than they would help it, even 
aside from the disruption issues. Finally, ( 4) there was no group of EU 
producers certain to benefit from sanctions. In one way, of course, the 
possibility of sanctions was an invitation to any and every producer 
group that wanted a protective tariff to ask for one. But no group could 
be confident that effort spent lobbying would pay off, partly because no 
group had anything resembling a claim of right to protection. 
If we now compare sanctions to an emissions-related import restric-
tion, we see a number of differences. (1) The embarrassment to general 
political and economic relations with affected exporting countries may 
be much the same- no difference there. (2) With regard to disruptions 
to supply chains, however, there is a difference. There will of course be 
disruptions resulting from the import restriction, possibly substantial 
ones, but by hypothesis, the importing country had already decided to 
confront precisely such disruptions when it adopted its restrictions on 
domestic production (at least, if the import restriction takes the form of a 
tax). (3) There is also a difference with regard to the overall harm to the 
5 J. Bhagwati and P. Mavroidis, 'Is action against US exports for failure to sign Kyoto 
Protocol WTO-Iegal?', World Trade Review 6 (2007), 299-310, argue against the EU 
imposing such restrictions, and they introduce their discussion with the FSC sanctions 
analogy. 
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economy. The sanction/tariff creates no benefit except to domestic 
producers and the treasury; in the conventional understanding, these 
benefits are outweighed by the loss to consumers (or other users) of the 
product. In contrast, the emissions-based import restriction creates a 
distinct benefit in the form of reduced worldwide emissions. Whether or 
not the import restriction induces the exporter to change its production 
methods, it will (normally) reduce the demand for goods made with 
high-emission processes; it will thus reduce the intensity of use of such 
processes and the total damage done by them. The emissions-based 
import restriction might still be 'irrational' for the importing country 
in the sense that the extra cost to it of producing goods with the low-
emissions process (or of buying only goods produced with the low-
emissions process) is less than the benefit that accrues to it from the 
reduced use of the high-emissions process, since the benefit of that 
reduced use is spread over the whole world. But still, that sort of 
irrationality - which from another perspective is mere global good 
citizenship - is something the importing country had already com-
mitted itself to when it decided to limit its own use of the high -emissions 
process in advance of comparable commitments by other countries. 
Finally, ( 4) in the case of the emissions-based import restriction, there 
is a particular producer group that can expect to benefit, and they have a 
very plausible claim of right to protection from imports produced using 
high-emission processes. This will affect both their motivation to lobby 
and the motivation of the political system to respond to their lobbying. 
There will also be another important lobby in favour of the restrictions, 
namely environmentalists, who play a role that has no analogue in the 
case of sanctions. 
In connection with this last point, it is unfortunate (although not 
unusual) that when Lamy discusses emissions-based import restrictions 
in his Bali speech, he speaks as if the only possible justification for such 
restrictions is offsetting the competitive disadvantage to domestic pro-
ducers caused by the domestic measures. If this were really the only thing 
to be said in favour of the restrictions (that they offset competitive 
disadvantage), they would be nothing more than protectionism -
which is more or less the impression Lamy conveys. But as we have 
seen, there is something else to be said in favour of the restrictions: they 
can be expected to reduce the global emissions of greenhouse gases. This 
not only constitutes an additional, non-protectionist justification, it also 
changes the way we should view the 'offsetting competitive disadvantage' 
justification. As I shall explain in section III, when there is the 
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appropriate sort of non-protectionist justification for the restriction, 
then offsetting the competitive disadvantage to domestic producers is 
desirable; indeed it is necessary if we are to achieve efficient location of 
production by the operation of comparative advantage. 
If we suppose that it is at least possible that some country might want 
to impose emissions-based import restrictions, the next question is 
whether there is any legal problem with this under the WTO. Some 
might argue that the Appellate Body settled the legal issues in US -
Shrimp.6 But surely that is too quick. The Appellate Body has made it 
clear that, unless they change their mind, process-based trade restrictions 
are not flatly forbidden across the board. One such has been definitively 
upheld. But the decision in Shrimp attracted vehement criticism from 
many WTO Members and many scholars, and it continues to do so? 
Although I think the Appellate Body was right both as a matter of treaty 
interpretation and as a matter of theory and policy, and I hope they will 
stick to their guns, I can also imagine them looking for ways to back away 
from Shrimp to some extent. There is no shortage of serious questions to 
be confronted. (1) Can we say, for example, that the capacity of the 
atmosphere to absorb C02 without serious damage to the climate is an 
'exhaustible natural resource'? (2) If not, are the particular measures 
being challenged 'necessary' to the protection of human, animal, or plant 
life or health? (3) Are the precise discriminations between which pro-
ducts are admitted and which are not admitted 'justifiable' in the sense 
required by the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT (which Shrimp I 
makes clear is a requirement with teeth)? All of these questions pre-
suppose that we have got to Article XX, where the burden of proof is on 
the respondent (importing) country. Given the practical difficulties of 
definition and administration that will attend any emissions-based 
import restriction,8 the importing country would like to avoid that 
6 United States -Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Recourse to 
Article 21.5), WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted 21 November 2001). 
7 As to the members' reaction, see C. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The 
Future of the World Trade Organization (Washington DC: AEI Press, 2001), pp. 48-50, 
p. 128. For an example of the scholarly criticism, see J. Bhagwati, In Defense of 
Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 153-8. 
8 Examples of the difficulties include: (1) defining the carbon emissions attributable to 
particular foreign products; (2) accounting for the fact that emissions permits have often 
been given away in the domestic system; (3) deciding how to treat products that have high 
carbon footprints because they come from countries that have chosen to meet their 
reduction commitments (under a Kyoto Protocol-style national emission-reduction 
target) in different ways from the importing country. 
HOW TO THINK ABOUT PPMs (AND CLIMATE CHANGE) 101 
burden of proof, and it can do so if it can persuade the Appellate Body 
that its restriction is a permitted border tax adjustment under Article II.2(a), 
or that it falls under, and is consistent with, Article III as expanded by the 
interpretive Note Ad III. What are the prospects for that? Or, what if the 
challenge is under the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT), 
where the issues are least restrictiveness and appropriateness to the local 
situation, and there is no textual analogue of Article XX at all? For that 
matter, does the TBT address unincorporated process-based restrictions? 
It is clear, then, that there are many important legal issues concerning 
emissions-based import restrictions that are still unsettled. But there are a 
number of other excellent articles that discuss these legal issues in detail,9 
and for the most part I do not propose to go over the legal terrain again. 
Instead, I want to talk about how we should think about 'PPMs', including 
emissions-based import restrictions, in general. Because the legal issues are 
so uncertain, people's views about them are inevitably influenced by their 
underlying prejudices and pre-dispositions concerning PPMs. The Border 
Tax Adjustment provisions in particular seem to function as a Rorschach 
blot for revealing people's pre-dispositions. Unfortunately, these pre-
dispositions are often based on confused thinking. 
Many intelligent, thoughtful, well-informed people make claims about 
the economics and the political morality of PPMs that are muddled or 
just wrong. For example, I think many people are confused about the 
relationship between PPMs and comparative advantage. It is often said 
that PPMs interfere with the operation of comparative advantage. The 
truth is that sometimes PPMs are essential if comparative advantage, 
properly understood, is to have its proper influence. There is also con-
fusion about when precisely one country's behaviour (or its producers' 
behaviour) creates an 'externality' vis-a-vis other countries. This confu-
sion, coupled with another about whether PPMs are necessarily aimed at 
getting exporting countries to change their policies, makes PPMs appear 
'coercive' even when they do not deserve to be regarded that way. My 
hope is that I can dispel some confusion, and that clearer thinking about 
the general nature of PPMs will lead to better legal decisions. 
9 e.g. R. Howse and A. Eliason, 'Domestic and international strategies to address climate 
change: an overview of the WTO legal issues', in this volume; J. Pauwelyn, 'US Federal 
Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International 
Trade Law', Working Paper NI WP 07-02, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy 
Solutions, Duke University (April 2007); P. Demaret and R. Stewardson, 'Border Tax 
Adjustments under GATT and EC law and general implications for environmental taxes', 
Journal of World Trade 28 (1994), 5-65. 
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II. What is a PPM? 
The initials 'PPM' refer to 'process or production method'. On its face, 
the concept has nothing to do with trade restrictions of any kind. But 
'PPM' is also now routinely used to refer to trade restrictions that are 
somehow based on the use or non-use by producers of particular pro-
cesses or production methods. This broader usage is ambiguous in an 
important way. I suspect that for most people the paradigm PPM is a 
restriction that says, for example, 'we will not allow the import of widgets 
from any country that permits the use of certain processes or production 
methods for producing widgets'. This I shall refer to as a 'country-based' 
PPM. A different sort of PPM, however, is one that says 'we will not allow 
the import of widgets that were themselves produced using certain 
processes or production methods'. This I shall refer to as a 'product-
based' PPM. The difference, of course, is that under the product-based 
PPM, widgets that are produced by approved techniques may be 
imported even if they come from a country that also permits the use of 
disapproved techniques. 10 
In what follows, 'PPMs' should be taken to refer only to product-based 
PPMs unless I specifically say otherwise. (I am also discussing only what 
are known as 'unincorporated PPMs' - restrictions based on processes 
or production methods that leave no distinctive trace in the physical 
constitution of the product when it arrives in the importing country. 
PPMs focusing on processes that do affect the physical constitution of 
the product are simply not controversial in the way unincorporated 
PPMs are.) The possible justifications for product-based and country-
based PPMs differ in a number of ways, some of which I shall come back 
to later. But for now, let me suggest a 'moral' difference between the two 
sorts of PPM. To begin, forget about PPMs for a moment. I take it we 
think there is a significant difference between an importing country 
saying, (1) 'We do not want that product because of what it is in itself 
(an unsafe toy, a car without a catalytic converter, an item of Nazi 
memorabilia)', and the same country saying, (2) 'We do not want that 
(otherwise innocent) product because it comes from you (the particular 
10 A third possibility is a 'producer-based' PPM, one that says 'we will not allow the import 
of widgets from any producer that uses certain processes or production methods for 
producing widgets (for any part of its production, not just the particular widgets we are 
importing)'. Although this is the category in which we would have to classify Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, a bit awkwardly, I shall simplify the discus-
sion in the text by ignoring this possibility. 
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exporting country).' Even if the exporting country is singled out by some 
general description of its behaviour (e.g. 'no widgets from countries that 
allow capital punishment'), the exclusion of innocent products because 
of the country they come from seems especially problematic. I do not 
mean to say it is never appropriate or allowable; just that it seems 
fundamentally more problematic than the exclusion of products that 
are objectionable in themselves. This antipathy towards country-based 
exclusion is one of the reasons for the intuitive appeal of the most-
favoured- nation principle. 11 
Accepting the intuitive appeal of making some distinction between the 
two sorts of restriction I have mentioned, let us now reintroduce PPMs; 
and specifically, let us ask which of the two sorts of restriction the 
different kinds of PPM seem most akin to. The country-based PPM is 
obviously akin to (2), the restriction that says, 'We do not want that 
(otherwise innocent) product because it comes from you.' Indeed, it is 
straightforwardly an instance of (2), with the disfavoured countries 
singled out because they permit certain production techniques. The 
product-based PPM is not straightforwardly an instance of either (1) 
or (2), but to my mind, is much more like (1) than (2). It does not exclude 
any product because of its country of origin. Rather it excludes a product 
only because of the way that product was produced. With the example of 
climate change before us, it is clear that there can be good reasons to care 
about how a product was produced - reasons every bit as compelling as 
the reasons to want safe toys, or to exclude Nazi memorabilia, and so on. 
Of course, product-based PPMs can be abused for covert protectionist 
purposes; but so can product regulations that focus on the intrinsic 
physical properties of the products. If the question is about the general 
'moral' status of a category of regulation, it seems clear to me that 
product-based PPMs are no more problematic in their general form 
than ordinary product regulations; and they are a world apart from 
country-based PPMs. 12 This discussion is intended only to make it 
11 In fact, I think there are deep questions about the ideal contours and justification (in 
terms of economics, political economy, and political morality) of the most-favoured-
nation principle that I have never seen properly addressed - but this is not the place for 
that discussion. 
12 In some cases, of course, the country-based PPM (or a producer-based PPM, seen. 10 
above) may be used by a country that would otherwise be content with a product-based 
PPM, because it is impossible to ascertain how a particular product was made except 
through a generalisation about products from that country (or that producer). So far as 
the law of the WTO is concerned, such country-based restrictions will still require a 
104 INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
initially plausible to distinguish between country-based and product-
based PPMs. For readers who disdain this sort of argument, we shall 
see that there are economic differences and other political economy 
differences as well. So, to reiterate, when I talk about PPMs I shall be 
talking about product-based PPMs unless the context clearly indicates 
otherwise. 
Now, a second point about the scope of 'PPMs'. For most people, the 
paradigm case of a PPM is a regulation, in the narrow sense in which a 
'regulation' is distinguished from a tax. Think of the Tuna/Dolphin cases 
or the Shrimp/Turtle case, or a hypothetical law excluding products 
produced by workers paid a sub-standard wage. But in connection with 
climate change, we may well be thinking about taxes that distinguish 
between products on the ground of the techniques used to produce them. 
In the discussion that follows, I shall generally not distinguish between 
PPMs that involve regulation in the narrow sense and PPMs that involve 
taxation. I shall use the word 'regulation' to encompass both cases, again 
unless the context indicates otherwise. It is true that the WTO agree-
ments have distinct provisions for the two cases; but the underlying 
conceptual issues are the same. And I think the legal results under the 
best reading of the various provisions are essentially the same for regula-
tions (narrow sense) and taxes. There is one distinctive issue in connec-
tion with taxes: who gets the revenue? The Border Tax Adjustment 
provisions seem to presuppose that the best, or natural, answer to that 
question is 'the country of consumption', under the 'destination princi-
ple'. But it is clear that both the drafters of the border tax provisions and 
the authors of the Border Tax Adjustment Report were focusing on taxes 
imposed primarily for fiscal reasons, as opposed to the regulatory 
(Pigovian) taxes we are thinking about in connection with climate 
change. That is one of the reasons the border tax provisions seem so ill 
suited to addressing the problem of emission-based PPMs. In fact, if 
emission-based PPMs appear, the system that includes them is very likely 
to end up giving the bulk of the revenue to the producing country -
which seems perfectly acceptable. In any event, this is one of the many 
problems of detail that I shall ignore in this paper, in order to concentrate 
on more fundamental issues. 
special demonstration of justification. This 'evidentiary' use of country of origin or 
producer identity is one of the many wrinkles I shall ignore in the remainder of this 
essay. I shall assume that any country-based PPM under discussion is not justified by this 
sort of evidentiary argument. 
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III. PPMs and comparative advantage 
I have heard both distinguished international economists and distin-
guished trade lawyers say that PPMs interfere with the operation of 
comparative advantage. This claim is at best misleading, and at worst 
false. The problem is that the notion of comparative advantage is ambig-
uous between what I shall call 'positive comparative advantage' and 
'normative comparative advantage'. Consequently, the claim that PPMs 
interfere with the operation of comparative advantage is ambiguous also. 
I am prepared to concede for present purposes that PPMs always inter-
fere with positive comparative advantage (although even this depends on 
how we define the alternative to the existence of the PPM). But the claim 
that PPMs interfere with positive comparative advantage, even if true, is 
no ground for objecting to PPMs. We would have a well-grounded 
objection to PPMs only if they interfered with normative comparative 
advantage. As to this, sometimes they do, but often they do not. Often a 
PPM is actually essential to the operation of normative comparative 
advantage, and hence to the achievement of efficiency. 
So first, what is the difference between positive and normative com-
parative advantage? Let us start with the textbook example. England and 
Portugal both produce wine and cloth. In autarchy, the transformation 
rates of wine into cloth differ between the two countries. If we imagine 
that in each country we transfer the resources needed to produce a barrel 
of wine in that country from wine production to cloth production, we get 
more new cloth in England than in Portugal. If trade barriers are now 
removed, we will see English cloth traded for Portuguese wine and both 
countries will be better off. This is comparative advantage at work. 
But notice that when we summarised the effect of removing trade 
barriers, we made two distinct claims: (1) English cloth will be traded for 
Portuguese wine, and (2) both countries will be better off. In the textbook 
example as we imagine it, and specifically with the implicit assumptions 
of no externalities and no regulation other than the initial trade barriers, 
these claims are both true; in this example they naturally go together. But 
in more complicated cases they can come apart. 
Imagine two countries, Barataria and Pontevidro, both of which pro-
duce widgets and gadgets. In every physical, technological, and demo-
graphic respect, the economies are identical - the same climate, same 
resources, same technology, same sized populations with the same dis-
tribution of consumer preferences. The only technology for producing 
widgets generates greenhouse gases (in both countries, and to the same 
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extent in both countries, since technology is identical). Gadget produc-
tion generates no greenhouse gases. Now, despite the identicalness of the 
economies in all the respects mentioned, there is one difference: in the 
legal system. Barataria imposes a tax on the emission of greenhouse gases 
that correctly internalises the global-warming externality, while 
Pontevidro has no such tax. Now, in autarchy, the relative price of 
widgets will be higher in Barataria than in Pontevidro. So, if we remove 
trade barriers, we will see Baratarian gadgets traded for Pontevidran 
widgets. But does this make both countries better off? No. It cannot be 
that both countries are better off, because the world is worse off. There is 
neither gain nor loss from the fact that a certain number of widgets that 
used to be produced in Barataria are now produced in Pontevidro and a 
certain number of gadgets that used to be produced in Pontevidro are 
now produced in Barataria, since the technologies (including external 
effects) are identical in both places. But, because Baratarian consumers 
now have access to lower-priced Pontevidran widgets, there is more 
widget production overall than there was in autarchy, and hence more 
global warming. There was already too much widget production in 
autarchy, since Pontevidro was generating greenhouse gases by produ-
cing widgets for itself without taking account of the cost. But now it is 
even worse, because, as noted, one of the effects of opening up trade will 
be an increase in widget production overall. 13 
What are we to say about comparative advantage in this example, 
where removing barriers creates trade, but that trade makes the world 
worse off? In order to describe what has happened in terms of the 
operation of comparative advantage, we must distinguish between 'posi-
tive comparative advantage' and 'normative comparative advantage'. 
'Positive comparative advantage' is just a matter of actual relative prices 
in the two countries in autarchy (or before the removal of some parti-
cular trade barrier we are considering removing). Positive comparative 
advantage is what explains trade flows when barriers are removed. In the 
Barataria/Pontevidro example, Pontevidro has a positive comparative 
advantage in widget production because of its non-taxation of green-
house gases. In contrast, 'normative comparative advantage' reflects real 
13 The reader might wonder whether other benefits from trade could outweigh this 
disadvantage, but in this stylised example there are no genuine benefits from trade at 
all. If both countries properly internalised the cost of greenhouse gases (or for that 
matter, if neither did), then in autarchy the relative prices of widgets and gadgets would 
be the same in both countries, and opening up borders would have no effect. (I ignore 
possible externalities of scale.) 
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costs of production, including externalities, and it is this concept that 
tells us where production should be located for global efficiency. In the 
Barataria/Pontevidro example, even though Pontevidro has a positive 
comparative advantage in widget production as a result of ignoring 
greenhouse gases, it has no normative comparative advantage; there is 
no efficiency gain of any kind to be had from relocating production from 
what obtains in autarchy. To be sure, in our example there is also no cost 
from the mere relocation of production. The harm in our example when 
barriers are removed is not from the relocation of production, but from 
the overall increase in widget production. Still, in our example, where 
positive comparative advantage diverges from normative comparative 
advantage, allowing the trade flows called forth by positive comparative 
advantage is inefficient and reduces world welfare. 
Our ultimate goal, remember, is to assess the claim that PPMs interfere 
with comparative advantage. Are we making any progress? In our 
Barataria/Pontevidro example as described so far, there is no PPM. The 
trade barriers in autarchy we assume take the form of across-the-board 
total embargoes on import or export; and once those barriers are 
removed, there are no barriers at all, therefore still no PPMs. But we 
can introduce a PPM. Let us imagine that, at the same time as the across-
the-board embargoes are removed by both countries, Barataria imposes a 
tax on imports made by a production method that emits greenhouse 
gases, the tax being identical to Barataria's tax on domestic greenhouse 
gas emission. This is a PPM. 14 Furthermore, this PPM plainly interferes 
with positive comparative advantage. With the PPM in force, we will see 
the same difference between the relative prices of widgets and gadgets in 
Barataria and Pontevidro that we saw in autarchy, because the PPM still 
blocks the trade flows that would eliminate this difference; removing the 
PPM (while leaving the domestic tax in place) would induce trade 
flows. 15 But this PPM does not interfere with normative comparative 
advantage, because as we have seen, Pontevidro has no normative com-
parative advantage. The PPM merely puts Pontevidran and Baratarian 
14 It may occur to the reader that in this particular example, Barataria could get the same 
effect by eliminating its tax on emission of greenhouse gases entirely and imposing an 
origin-neutral internal tax on the sale of widgets. But this observation in no way under-
mines the appropriateness of using the case where the tax takes the form of a domestic 
process tax and a PPM for thinking about the effects of PPMs. 
15 If Barataria removed both the PPM and the internal tax, we would see no trade flows. 
Widget production would rise in Barataria and gadget production would fall, but after 
that adjustment, there would be no impetus to cross-border trade. 
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producers on the same footing. Removing the PPM would allow 
Pontevidran producers to exploit a positive difference between the legal 
systems of the countries, for which there is no normative justification. 
Removing the PPM would make the world worse off by inducing exces-
sive widget production. 
What is the upshot for the claim that PPMs interfere with comparative 
advantage? I am prepared to concede for present purposes that PPMs 
(assuming they bind at all) always interfere with positive comparative 
advantage. 16 But our hypothetical case is a counter-example to the claim 
that PPMs always interfere with normative comparative advantage. In 
our hypothetical case, the PPM does not interfere with normative com-
parative advantage; in fact, it increases efficiency, or reduces inefficiency, 
by preventing over-production of widgets beyond what occurs in aut-
archy. It is only the stylisation of the hypothetical case that has made 
possible some of the precise claims about the positive and normative 
consequences of various regulatory regimes; but it should be obvious that 
the general point I am making extends much beyond such stylised cases. 
Notice that my claim is not that PPMs never interfere with normative 
comparative advantage. Sometimes they do - and this is true even 
though I always assume that the substance of any PPM is applied to 
domestic production as well as imports. Let us look at an example where 
a PPM does interfere with normative comparative advantage. We have 
only to change our current example in two ways. First, we assume that 
instead of generating greenhouse gases, widget production causes noise 
in the neighbourhood of the factory. Second, we assume that Pontevidrans 
and Baratarians have just one difference in their preferences: Baratarians 
are very sensitive to noise, and Pontevidrans are very insensitive. Hence 
Barataria, but not Pontevidro, imposes a noise abatement tax on widget 
production. As before, in autarchy there will be a difference in relative 
prices in the two countries, and removing trade barriers will induce trade 
flows. But in this case, the trade flows will actually make the world better 
off. There is a noise externality from widget production in Barataria, 
which the noise abatement tax internalises. There is no corresponding 
noise externality from widget production in Pontevidro. There is the 
16 This assumes that if we removed the PPM, we would leave all domestic regulation in 
place. If the alternative to the PPM is no PPM and the domestic tax or regulation is 
removed as well, then the change could move positive comparative advantage in either 
direction, or it could leave it unchanged. But discussion of positive effects in all cases is 
not my present concern. 
HOW TO THINK ABOUT PPMs (AND CLIMATE CHANGE) 109 
same noise, but Pontevidrans do not mind it, so there is no externality. 
As a consequence, widgets really are relatively cheaper to produce in 
Pontevidro; the relocation of widget production to Pontevidro is a good 
thing, as is the increased global production of widgets that results once 
Baratarian consumers have access to Pontevidran widgets. In this case, if 
Barataria imposed a noise-based PPM that taxed on the basis of the 
noise level (the same as the domestic tax), it would interfere with 
Pontevidro's normative comparative advantage. 
To summarise our conclusions thus far: The notion of 'comparative 
advantage' is ambiguous between positive and normative comparative 
advantage. Hence, the claim that PPMs interfere with comparative advan-
tage is ambiguous between the claim that PPMs interfere with positive 
comparative advantage and the claim that PPMs interfere with normative 
comparative advantage. Even if PPMs always interfere with positive com-
parative advantage, that offers no ground for a general argument against 
PPMs, since interfering with positive comparative advantage is sometimes a 
good thing. In contrast, the claim that PPMs always interfere with norma-
tive comparative advantage would ground a general argument against 
PPMs, if it were true. But it is not. 17 
Lest the reader worry about my larger intentions, I am not recom-
mending that the Appellate Body try to formulate all WTO law on the 
principle of normative comparative advantage. The task of the Appellate 
Body is to interpret a treaty; some parts of that treaty make sense as 
attempts to facilitate the operation of normative comparative advantage, 
and some do not. I am suggesting that when the Appellate Body is 
interpreting textual language that is in some respect unclear, but the 
basic object of which seems to be to encourage efficient regulation (as in 
Articles I, II, III, XI, and XX of the GATT, and the corresponding articles 
of the GATS, and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
17 It might be suggested that we can argue against PPMs in general on the grounds that 
most PPMs interfere with normative comparative advantage, and it is too much trouble, 
or too difficult, to distinguish between good PPMs and bad ones. So we ban them all. I am 
sceptical of both of the premises of this argument, but I shall not pursue the argument in 
this form. We should be extremely reluctant to condemn PPMs across the board if PPMs 
might be of significant help in addressing one of the greatest problems the world faces, 
namely global warming. If need be, I would separate out PPMs dealing with greenhouse 
gases and other climate related issues as a special category and, without regard to how we 
treat other PPMs, worry specifically about whether these climate related PPMs interfere 
with normative comparative advantage, and how we can tell, even if that requires 
investing more effort into making the required distinctions than would be worthwhile 
in connection with other PPMs. But I am not persuaded that is necessary. 
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Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and TBT), then we would hope the 
Appellate Body would be influenced in its interpretation by correct 
views on how certain sorts of measure are connected in principle to 
efficiency. I should also say that I am not offering here a complete theory 
of normative comparative advantage. My reasons for not doing so are 
connected to the existence of the deep puzzles I mentioned earlier about 
the justification of the most-favoured-nation principle. I hope that the 
claims about normative comparative advantage that I have made in 
connection with particular examples can be accepted on their own, 
without a comprehensive theory. 
Before going on, let me make some remarks about the 'level playing 
field' metaphor and about the use of the word 'distortion'. A standard 
argument against PPMs is that they interfere with comparative advan-
tage, and I have explained why that is a misleading over-generalisation. A 
standard argument in favour of PPMs is that they are required to 'level 
the playing field' on which domestic and foreign producers compete. 
This is a precisely complementary and equally misleading over-
generalisation. (Ironically, since many people see the fallacy in this 
argument for PPMs, that may encourage the overbroad rejection of 
PPMs.) Sometimes we should 'level the playing field', specifically when 
the disfavoured process creates the same externality when used in the 
foreign country that it creates when used at horne (as in our greenhouse 
gas emission case). In this case, correcting for the externality in connec-
tion with domestic but not foreign production is both inefficient and 
'unfair' to domestic producers. In contrast, if the disfavoured process 
does not create the same externality when used in the foreign country as 
it creates when used at horne (as in the noise abatement case), then the 
playing field should not be levelled. Production ought to occur where it 
generates less social cost, and 'levelling the playing field' with a PPM will 
interfere with that. Nor is it 'unfair' to domestic producers that they 
should be charged for a social cost they impose, while their foreign 
competitors using the same process are not similarly charged because 
in context they do not impose a similar cost. In sum, we should 'level the 
playing field' precisely when a PPM does not interfere with the operation 
of normative comparative advantage but rather facilitates it; and we 
should not 'level the playing field' when a PPM would interfere with 
the operation of normative comparative advantage. Complementary 
overgeneralisations, as I said. 
As to 'distortion', all that needs to be done is to point out that it is 
ambiguous in the same way as 'comparative advantage'. When it is 
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claimed that a measure 'distorts' trade, it is natural to take this as a 
normative claim that the measure interferes with efficiency and is there-
fore bad; 'distort' in ordinary speech carries a negative normative con-
notation. But all too often people claim some measure distorts trade 
simply on the ground that it alters trade flows. This positive claim, even if 
true, does not entail any normative claim of inefficiency. Unfortunately, 
it strongly connotes such a claim; and I think people who speak carelessly 
about distortion often mislead not only their audience but themselves. 
IV. PPMs, externalities, and 'coercion' 
Let us now press forward again with the discussion of PPMs and com-
parative advantage. (Hereafter, by 'comparative advantage', I shall mean 
normative comparative advantage unless the context indicates other-
wise.) The lesson we learn from comparing the greenhouse gas example 
with the noise abatement example is that, at least in this sort of case, 
whether a PPM interferes with the operation of comparative advantage 
or supports it depends on whether the targeted process creates an 
externality when it is used in the exporting country. This raises the 
question of what counts as an externality. I assume most of my readers 
would agree that greenhouse gas emission is an externality, whether the 
emitting country cares about the climate consequences (or even wel-
comes them) or not, but perhaps I am over-optimistic. In any event, it 
will be conducive to our general understanding if we consider briefly the 
question of the status ofPPMs when there is disagreement, even reason-
able disagreement, about the significance of the 'external' effects of the 
targeted process. 
Take the case of tuna fishing using methods that kill dolphins. I 
assume the relevant species of dolphin is not endangered. Aside from 
the question of species preservation, some countries, such as the United 
States, regard it as morally offensive to kill such intelligent animals. They 
want the dolphins to live. Some countries (let us say Pontevidro again, to 
remain hypothetical) have no such feelings about dolphins. Suppose the 
United States enacts a law forbidding its domestic tuna fleet from using 
certain methods particularly dangerous to dolphins; and suppose it then 
adopts a PPM that excludes imports of tuna from other countries unless 
it has been fished by methods as dolphin friendly as those allowed US 
fishermen. Is this PPM defensible on my earlier analysis or not? Does the 
use of dolphin-unfriendly fishing techniques by the Pontevidran fleet 
impose an externality? 
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I have heard people argue that because of the disagreement about the 
importance of not killing dolphins, we cannot say on any objective 
grounds whether there is an externality here. (There is no disagreement, 
I assume, about what fishing methods kill dolphins at what rate. The 
disagreement is about whether that matters.) I have heard other people 
argue that there is definitely not an externality from dolphin-unfriendly 
fishing by the Pontevidran fleet, because Pontevidro does not value 
dolphins. Both of these claims are wrong. There is an externality here, 
in the sense that is relevant to thinking about efficiency. If the killing of 
dolphins by Pontevidran fishermen makes Americans unhappy, that is a 
genuine cost of such killing, and it is one the Pontevidran fishermen do 
not take into account. If this cost is not somehow internalised, 
Pontevidran fishermen will kill more dolphins than is efficient. That 
there is an externality here is simply not subject to doubt. 
But notice I have said nothing as yet about how the cost to American 
sensibilities should be internalised. I think many people resist the claim 
that there is an externality in this case because they have in the back of 
their minds the 'polluter pays principle', or a broader analogous principle 
that says the 'active agent' causing an externality should pay, or be 
stopped, or at least be discouraged. But of course, the cost could equally 
be internalised if the United States offered to pay Pontevidran fishermen 
for not killing dolphins. And if we imagine for the moment that the US 
view about dolphins is thoroughly idiosyncratic, it may well seem that 
fairness requires that the cost should be internalised by the United States 
bribing Pontevidro to stop killing dolphins (or providing them with 
dolphin-safe technology, or whatever), rather than by Pontevidro being 
coerced by a PPM to stop killing them. 
There is something in this claim that the United States should pay; but 
it should not seem completely right either. The specific measure the 
United States is proposing amounts to no more than a refusal to buy 
tuna that has been fished at the expense of dolphins' lives. Such a refusal 
to buy is not normally seen as 'coercion'. Ifi decide to switch from my old 
lawn-mowing service to a new one because the new one uses ethanol 
from sugar as a fuel for its mowers, I am not 'coercing' my old service to 
change their fuel, not even if I am such an important customer that they 
do in fact change their fuel to keep my business. A decision not to buy 
what one does not want is not 'coercion' of the seller; it is part of the 
normal operation of a market economy. And the United States imposing 
a PPM (product-based, remember) on Pontevidran tuna is just an 
instance of a consumer (now a 'collective' consumer) not buying what 
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he (or it) does not want. For the reader who is troubled by this reference 
to a 'collective' consumer, I shall say more about that in a moment. But 
first, notice how limited, at least formally speaking, is the effect on 
Pontevidran fishermen of the US decision not to buy. 
There is a great deal of Pontevidro's behaviour that the United States 
cannot hope to touch by a (product-based) PPM - for example, 
Pontevidro's catching some tuna by dolphin-unfriendly methods and 
exporting that tuna to third countries that do not care about dolphins. 
Even this behaviour imposes an externality on the United States. Again, 
that there is an externality should be uncontroversial. But even though 
there is an externality, we are not at all inclined to appeal to the notion 
that the active agent behind the externality should be made to stop, given 
our assumption that the US position is idiosyncratic. Rather, this is a case 
where we think the United States should get relief only if it is willing to 
pay Pontevidro to change its ways. But even if the United States should 
have to pay Pontevidro if it wants to change the way Pontevidro catches 
tuna for third-country markets (or its home market), it still seems that 
the United States should be free to refuse to buy for itself a product 
(dolphin-unfriendly tuna) that it does not want. This is not 'active agent 
pays', which is unacceptable as a general principle in the present circum-
stances. This, as I have said, is just the operation of the market. 
Returning now to the 'collective consumer' issue, there are two differ-
ences that may seem significant between the US regulation on tuna and 
my decision about the lawn-mowing service. First, the United States 
definitely is coercing those consumers in the United States who do not 
care about dolphins and would like to buy cheaper tuna. But govern-
ments coerce their own citizens all the time; and they are justified in 
coercing them to prevent them from imposing externalities on their 
fellow citizens, as dolphin-indifferent consumers of tuna do on their 
fellow citizens who like dolphins (because purchases of dolphin-
unfriendly tuna encourage dolphin mortality). 18 There may be some 
limits to this 'externality-preventing' justification; there may be some 
individual behaviour that a government is not justified in preventing 
solely on the ground that it makes others unhappy. But consuming 
dolphin-unfriendly tuna is not such behaviour. This is paradigmatically 
the sort of case where a government can regulate behaviour on pure 
18 When dolphin-unfriendly tuna is purchased, then in the normal course of events, the 
retailer, wholesaler, distributor, and importer will resupply along the same supply chain, 
which means more dolphin-unfriendly tuna will be fished. 
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preference-maximising grounds. So this internal coercion is not a pro-
blem. And as to the Pontevidran fishermen, there is no coercion at all, 
merely the United States announcing what sort of tuna it wants to buy 
once all affected domestic interests are brought to bear on the consump-
tion decision. 19 
Second, we might worry that the United States as a huge collective 
consumer has a degree of market power that an individual consumer 
almost never has, and that its ban on dolphin-unfriendly tuna may 
constitute exploitation of that market power. But we need to exercise 
the same kind of care in connection with the word 'exploitation' that I 
have already discussed in connection with 'comparative advantage' and 
'distortion'. The United States is a huge presence in international trade. 
Consequently, a US PPM on tuna is likely to have a significant effect on 
foreign tuna fishermen, who may face a choice between changing their 
technology, which they may not have the capital to do, or losing market 
share. But we should not call this 'exploitation' of the US market power, 
which has a strong normative connotation of disapproval, unless it leads 
to inefficiency. Even if we think decency requires the United States to 
provide assistance to Pontevidran fishermen if they are in fact too poor to 
invest on their own in new fishing technology (the cost of which would 
presumably be mostly recouped in higher prices), still that is a matter of 
the particular circumstances of these fishermen. It is not a consequence 
of any general principles concerning the use of PPMs, principles which 
must govern relations between countries of all different relative sizes and 
19 The references in the text to preference maximisation and considering all affected 
domestic interests might seem to suggest that the US Government ought to consider 
the preferences of not only its own citizens, but also the Pontevidran fishermen. But as I 
have explained elsewhere, when the effects on Pontevidrans are market mediated, as they 
are here (that is, when the effects flow only from the terms on which someone is willing 
to engage in a market transaction with the Pontevidrans), efficiency does not require that 
they be considered by the United States. Donald Regan, 'What are trade agreements 
for? - two conflicting stories told by economists, with a lesson for lawyers', Journal of 
International Economic Law 9 (2006), 951-88. Remember the lawn-service example. 
Efficiency does not require that when I decide on what lawn service to use, I consider the 
interests of the lawn-service owners. Rather, I consult my own interests in deciding what 
I want to buy at what price; they consult their interests in deciding what to offer at what 
price; and (in the absence of monopolistic or monopsonistic behaviour) efficiency 
results. Notice that the external effects within the United States- the effect of Jones's 
purchase of dolphin-unfriendly tuna on Smith's sensibilities- are not market mediated. 
They flow from Jones's market behaviour, but as between Jones and Smith, they flow 
without any market relationship between them. That is why government intervention is 
required to achieve efficiency. 
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developmental levels. The claim that in general the user of a PPM should 
compensate affected exporters for their loss has no more moral or 
economic justification than Saudi Arabia's claim that it should be com-
pensated if the other countries of the world succeed in reducing their 
demand for oil. 
With regard to the question of whether the US PPM, in conjunction 
with the US market power, actually does lead to inefficiency, the answer 
is, 'No, not unless the United States is purposefully aiming at effects that it 
can achieve only because of its market power.' The full purport of that 
answer will hardly be immediately obvious; I have explained it and 
justified it at length elsewhere.20 The crucial points for now are: (1) the 
mere fact that the US behaviour has certain effects because of the US 
market power that it would not have otherwise is not enough to cause 
inefficiency or to justify us in complaining of exploitation of market 
power; and (2) in the thumbnail sketch of the US motives for the PPM 
that I have given, there is nothing to suggest exploitation of market 
power or inefficiency (nor would there be even if the PPM were partly 
consciously motivated by a desire to 'level the playing field' for US 
fishermen, provided the concern for dolphins is genuine). 
Perhaps a thought experiment will make it more intuitive that the PPM 
does not exploit the US market power. The reason we need a PPM (speci-
fically, a PPM that goes beyond the provision of information to consumers) 
is that the class of people who consume tuna and the class of people who 
care about dolphins are not the same. Imagine for the moment that we hold 
the overall national profile of preferences over tuna prices and dolphin 
mortality constant, but we redistribute some of the preferences between 
individuals, so that the people who eat tuna and the people who care about 
dolphins are now the same. Now, assuming consumers have the means to 
distinguish dolphin-friendly tuna from dolphin-unfriendly tuna, we would 
see no purchases of dolphin-unfriendly tuna, even without any government 
regulation. But no one could claim that the purely private choices of all these 
consumers to reject dolphin-unfriendly tuna would count as the exploita-
tion of market power or would create inefficiency. Returning now to the 
world of preferences as they are actually distributed, the function of the 
PPM in this world is simply to bring all relevant domestic preferences to 
bear on choices about tuna, just as happens in our imagined world of 
redistributed preferences without government intervention. So the PPM 
in the actual world is not exploitive either. 
20 Ibid. 
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Changing the topic somewhat, there is another reason PPMs are often 
thought of as 'coercive'. They are often assumed to be aimed at altering 
exporting countries' internal policies regarding production, a goal which is 
suspect. Now, it is true that PPMs may be aimed at altering other coun-
tries' internal policies. But this is not a necessary feature- certainly not of 
product-based PPMs, and in fact not even of country-based PPMs. With 
regard to product-based PPMs, the United States could quite sensibly 
maintain its ban on dolphin-hostile tuna even it were perfectly clear that 
Pontevidro would not change its national policy in response to the PPM, 
and in fact that no individual Pontevidran fisherman would change his 
behaviour. The United States might like to see such changes, but if it knows 
they are not going to happen, then bringing them about cannot be a part of 
its goal. Its goal, still fully adequate to explain the PPM, is just to minimise 
the demand for (and thus the production of) dolphin-hostile tuna, and 
perhaps also to avoid its own complicity in dolphin mortality. 
The case might seem to be different with regard to country-based PPMs, 
since the importer may now exclude some shipments of dolphin-friendly 
tuna originating in the non-complying country. But even this might be 
justified (even if it is known that Pontevidro will not change its policy) as a 
means of reducing overall demand for dolphin-hostile tuna. Purchases by 
the United States of dolphin-friendly Pontevidran tuna might still increase 
the fishing of dolphin-hostile tuna ifPontevidran fishermen redirect to the 
US market dolphin-friendlytuna that they would have caught anyway and 
sold to dolphin-indifferent consumers, and if they then replace the redir-
ected quantity with newly caught dolphin-hostile tuna. Once we start 
down this road, we will eventually realise that even the United States 
consuming its own fishermen's dolphin-friendly tuna may have the ulti-
mate consequence that more tuna is taken by dolphin-hostile methods by 
fishermen of other countries. But it would be a mistake to treat the US 
failure to go all the way to the end of this line (which may also not be 
necessary, depending on the economic facts) as definitively revealing that a 
country-based PPM must be in bad faith (that is, must have a coercive or 
protectionist purpose). There are good reasons to be more suspicious of 
country-based PPMs than of product-based PPMs, but that is not to say 
that country-based PPMs are necessarily aimed at changing exporting 
countries' policies, nor that they are always illegal. 
It seems possible that one of the reasons the Appellate Body's opinion 
in US - Shrimp was so unpopular is that the Appellate Body seemed 
willing to uphold some PPMs despite regarding all PPMs as intrinsically 
coercive. To my mind, it is not at all clear what the Appellate Body is 
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actually saying about a whole tangle of issues concerning coerciveness, 
the purpose behind PPMs, and the relevance of the distinction between 
country-based and product-based PPMs (specifically, whether it was 
essential to the legality of the revised US PPM that it provided for 
shipment-by-shipment certification of shrimp from non-certified coun-
tries). I do not have space here for anything like a complete discussion. 
But in paragraph 161 and paragraph 165 the Appellate Body makes it 
very clear that it regards the unrevised PPM as coercive (it refers in 
paragraph 161 to the measure's 'intended and actual coercive effect', and 
it says in paragraph 165 that the measure is 'concerned with effectively 
influencing' other members' policies). And yet, the Appellate Body seems 
to object not to the coerciveness in itself, but to the particular goal of 
making other countries adopt turtle protection programmes identical to 
that of the United States, even where such measures were not necessary. 
And back in paragraph 121, the Appellate Body had said that 'condition-
ing access to a Member's domestic market on whether exporting 
Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally pre-
scribed by the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common 
aspect of measures falling within the scope of one or another of the 
exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX'. 
Now, 'conditioning access to a Member's domestic market on whether 
exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy' is not logically 
equivalent to trying to coerce them into adopting that policy; as we 
have noted, the importing Member might impose the condition on 
imports even though it knows no change in the exporting member's 
policy will result. But in conjunction with the later discussion that 
finds coercion in the US measure, it almost seems as if the Appellate 
Body is saying coercion is a common aspect of all measures falling within 
Article XX of the GATT. 
The water is further muddied by the fact that it is not even true that 
conditioning access on the exporting member's policy is a common 
element of all measures that fall within Article XX (not even if we include 
cases where the conditioning does not amount to coercion). The measure 
by France in Asbestos that the Appellate Body upheld under Article XX 
(after also finding that it did not violate Article III) said nothing about 
Canada's policies.21 It merely excluded asbestos and asbestos products, 
without regard to the country of origin or that country's policies. 
21 EC- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R 
(adopted 5 April 2001). 
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The Appellate Body's seeming desire to defend coercion may reflect 
the tendency of exporting members to complain that any measure that 
excludes any of their products is 'coercive'. The Appellate Body is right, 
of course, that on this understanding of 'coercion' many coercive mea-
sures will pass Article XX. Indeed, on this understanding, many coercive 
measures should never even get to Article XX, because they will pass 
review under Article III. But this is not a reasonable understanding of 
'coercion'. The Appellate Body should not indulge it or encourage it. 
Given the general confusion about PPMs, the Appellate Body should 
not write opinions that reinforce the view that all PPMs are coercive, or 
that PPMs have any special affinity with coercion. 
V. Three fragments oflegal analysis 
As noted above, I do not propose to go step by step through all possible 
lines oflegal analysis of emission-based import restrictions; for the most 
part, that would merely repeat what others have said. I do want to make 
three quick points that I do not think duplicate what can be found 
elsewhere. All three points concern the question of whether PPMs violate 
the primary prohibitory provisions of the GATT, in particular Articles II 
and III. Of course, even if PPMs do violate the primary prohibitory 
provisions, they may be justified under Article XX of the GATT, like 
the import restriction in Shrimp. Some people think the Article XX issues 
are the only ones worth discussing, on the grounds that the Appellate 
Body will always find a PPM in violation of some primary prohibitory 
provision. But I shall say nothing here about Article XX; even if it ends up 
being the crucial provision, the basic framework for legal analysis under 
Article XX is reasonably clear.22 Also, I am not persuaded that Article XX 
is the only provision in play. That PPMs are always prima facie illegal is 
certainly the conventional wisdom. But then, it was conventional wis-
dom before Shrimp that PPMs were not only prima facie illegal, but also 
unconditionally unjustifiable under Article XX. That conventional wis-
dom was overthrown in Shrimp when the Appellate Body simply applied 
22 What is clear is the framework. There will be excruciatingly difficult questions about the 
application to the facts of particular ideas: whether the restrictions on domestic and 
foreign production are comparable in the way that Article XX(g) implicitly requires, or 
whether some measure is 'unjustifiable discrimination', and in particular, how to apply 
in a very different context the basic idea of Shrimp that a measure must not require 
technology that is unnecessary in the exporter's circumstances. But to my mind there is 
little to be said about these issues until we have a concrete measure before us. 
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the treaty language. Since I think the treaty language also indicates that 
some PPMs are not even prima facie illegal, I have hopes that the 
Appellate Body may eventually confirm that as well. (Notice the 
Appellate Body has not yet considered a product-based PPM under 
Article II or III.) Since respondent members will obviously prefer to 
have their PPMs upheld at this very first stage, for burden of proof 
reasons if no others, the possibility is worth discussing. Along with Rob 
Howse, I have argued elsewhere that PPMs (product-based PPMs, 
remember) do not automatically violate Article III.23 I shall not repeat 
what I have said already. These three new 'fragments' oflegal analysis can 
be fitted into the general scheme Howse and I have developed. 
Fragment (1): a hypothetical case 
Here I simply want to describe a hypothetical PPM that it seems to me we 
must conclude does not violate Article III; it cannot be justified under 
Article XX, because of the closed list of purposes, and yet it seems to me 
inconceivable that the drafters of the GATT would have wanted to forbid 
it. Here is the scenario: Home has an industry that produces widgets by a 
process that emits noxious odours affecting a substantial region around 
the factories. Home does not import widgets. As a result of political 
organisation by residents of the area around the widget plants, Home 
adopts a regulation forbidding the use of the odour-emitting process for 
widget production, and the producers switch to a more expensive, but 
less offensive process. At this point it becomes possible for foreign widget 
producers, who still use the cheaper, odour-emitting process, to export 
widgets to Home. As it happens, Foreign's widget factories are right on 
the Home/Foreign border; and it even happens that prevailing winds are 
such that the odour from the Foreign plants affects only residents of 
Home. So the residents of the border region combine with Home widget 
producers to secure a PPM, forbidding the sale in Home of widgets made 
with the odour-emitting process. 
Now, I cannot believe that the drafters of the GATT would have 
wanted to forbid this PPM. It is both efficient and fair: the Foreign widget 
producers are generating an externality in Home; they have no normative 
comparative advantage over Home widget producers; the history of the 
23 R. Howse and D. Regan, The product/process distinction - an illusory basis for 
disciplining "unilateralism" in trade policy', European Journal of International Law 11 
(2000), 249-89. 
120 INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
PPM makes it clear that Home's concern with the odour is not a mere 
excuse for protectionism; and all Home is doing is trying to avoid causing 
harm to itself by its own widget purchases. But is this PPM allowed by the 
GATT as it stands? If we take the legal issues out of order and ask 
whether this PPM can be justified under Article XX, it seems very 
doubtful that it can. There are no known health effects (on humans, 
animals, or plants) associated with the odours. The only way to bring this 
within Article XX would be to find that 'odour-free air' is an exhaustible 
natural resource. But if we add the plausible assumption that the odour 
dissipates entirely within twenty-four hours if the source is not continu-
ously renewed, then to say this PPM was protecting an 'exhaustible 
natural resource' would be to give up completely on 'ordinary meaning 
in context'. It would make a mockery of the specific listing in Article XX. 
Much better to say that the PPM does not violate Article III (which is the 
relevant provision, because of the Note Ad III) in the first place. After all, 
this PPM has nothing to do with protectionism, which is what Article III 
is aimed at. In sum, we cannot plausibly claim that PPMs always violate 
Article III. This case is a counter-example. 
Fragment (2): the relevance of regulatory purpose 
Here I may be cheating a bit. I have said a great deal elsewhere about the 
role of regulatory purpose under Article III of the GATT. 24 But I have not 
done so since the Appellate Body decided Dominican Republic -
Cigarettes,25 and in any event there are always new readers. Once we 
have decided that PPMs do not automatically violate Article III, it is 
inevitable that the issue will arise, in connection with PPMs, of the 
relevance of regulatory purpose. The conventional wisdom is that the 
Appellate Body has definitively rejected consideration of regulatory 
purpose. But the conventional wisdom is wrong, not just about the best 
reading of the treaty, but about what the Appellate Body has actually 
done. So, very briefly: 
24 D. Regan, 'Regulatory purpose and "like products" in Article III:4 of the GATT (with 
additional remarks on Article III:2)', Journal of World Trade 36 (2002), 443-78, and 
'Further thoughts on the role of regulatory purpose under Article III of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade~ a tribute to Bob Hudec', Journal of World Trade 37 
(2003), 737-60. 
25 Dominican Republic ~ Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of 
Cigarettes, WT!DS302/AB!R (adopted 19 May 2005). 
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It is unfortunate that the two 'leading' cases about Article III are 
Japan - Alcohol26 and EC - Asbestos.27 Both cases tend to mislead 
readers about the Appellate Body's actual views and behaviour. (The 
focus on these cases is understandable, because of the timing of Japan 
and the anticipation that preceded Asbestos, but it is still unfortunate.) In 
Japan- Alcohol, the Appellate Body denied any interest in the subjective 
intentions oflegislators, and people took this to mean that the Appellate 
Body was denying the relevance of regulatory purpose. But in Chile -
Alcohol, which people somehow read without actually noticing what it 
says, the Appellate Body says explicitly, and more than once, that con-
sideration of regulatory purpose is essential.28 Indeed, it says explicitly 
that ascertaining regulatory purpose was the precise point of looking at 
the 'design, architecture, and structure' of the measure in Japan. 29 On the 
issue of regulatory purpose, Chile plainly overturns the conventional 
wisdom about Japan. It does not overturn Japan, since Japan never 
denied the relevance of purpose in the first place. 
With regard to Asbestos, the Appellate Body seems to imply that 
regulatory purpose is not relevant to 'likeness' by its focus on the criteria 
in the Border Tax Adjustment Report, especially consumer preferences. 
But in finding asbestos and PCG fibres unlike, the Appellate Body is so 
bizarrely indifferent to the actual facts of consumers' revealed prefer-
ences that one wonders how seriously to take their analysis. In any event, 
they emphasise in the Delphic paragraph 100 that a finding oflikeness is 
not the end of the matter, and they at least leave room for regulatory 
purpose to be relevant to the issue of 'less favourable treatment' for 
foreign goods. They say that there is less favourable treatment only if 
the 'group' oflike imported products is treated less favourably than tlle 
'group' oflike domestic products. To my mind, the most plausible read-
ing of this, although not the only one, is that there is less favourable 
treatment only if foreign products are disfavoured because they are 
26 Japan ~ Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT!DSS & DS10 & DS11/AB/R (adopted 1 
November 1996). 
27 EC ~Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R 
(adopted 5 April2001). 
28 Chile~ Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT!DS87 & DS110/AB/R (adopted 12 January 
2000), paragraphs 62, 71. 
29 Ibid., paragraph 71. The reader may remember that the Chile report talks about ascer-
taining 'objective' purpose; lest one think this means the Appellate Body will look at 
nothing but the face of the measure, elsewhere in the Chile opinion, the Appellate Body 
considers Chile's proffered non-protectionist explanations for its tax scheme, although it 
fmds none of them persuasive. 
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foreign. And then in DR- Cigarettes, they come even closer to asserting 
explicitly the relevance of regulatory purpose: '[T]he existence of a 
detrimental effect on a given imported product resulting from a measure 
does not necessarily imply that this measure accords less favourable 
treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is explained by factors or 
circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product, such as the 
market share of the importer in this case.'30 This is not quite an explicit 
endorsement of consideration of purpose, but the only way to make sense 
of the reference to 'explanation' is in terms of regulatory purpose. 31 
Certainly this statement gives the lie to any claim that consideration of 
purpose has been definitively excluded. 
Fragment (3 ): avoiding border tax issues 
Although much ink has been spilled about how emissions-based taxes 
would fare under the border tax provisions of the GATT, in particular 
Article I1.2(a), it seems to me we may be able to sidestep II:2(a) entirely. 
The Note Ad III has been most often discussed in connection with 
regulations and the relation between Articles III and XI, but it applies 
also to taxes and charges, and thus to the relation between Articles III and 
II; it is a 'border tax adjustment' principle in itself. Suppose we consider a 
measure that says in more precise terms something like: 'No widget may 
be sold, used, or consumed in this country unless taxes have been paid [to 
any government, here or abroad] [or other payments have been made to 
purchase emission permits] in connection with its production [and not 
remitted] that reflect the carbon emissions in its production history.' It is 
not entirely clear whether this is a regulation or a tax; perhaps it is a 
regulation in respect of widgets on which the relevant taxes have been 
previously paid, and a tax in respect of widgets on which they have not. 
But insofar as it is a tax, it seems to be a tax that 'applies to the product' 
(the relevant language of the Note Ad III), even though the amount 
payable depends on earlier taxes levied during the production process. 
So the tax should be reviewed under Article III. This avoids entirely the 
issues under Article II:2(a) concerning what counts as 'an article from 
which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in 
30 DR ~ Cigarettes, n. 25 above, paragraph 96. 
3 
t If we knew nothing of the jurisprudential context, we might take this quote from 
Cigarettes as saying that only origin-specific regulation is illegal under Article III. But 
we know that cannot be what it means. 
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whole or in part'. It might be suggested that this reading of the Note Ad 
III renders Article II.2(a) inutile. I have no space here for a full discus-
sion, but here are two quick responses. First, we should be cautious with 
arguments from inutility, remembering that some redundancy is both 
inevitable and even desirable in most legislation. Second, Article II.2(a) 
retains a distinct function, even given the suggested reading of the Note 
Ad III, in authorising taxes in a form that would otherwise be unaccep-
table; in particular, a tax levied on imported gadgets at the border that 
compensates for an internal tax on some input physically incorporated 
into the imported gadgets, where there is no internal tax on gadgets 
themselves at all. 
VI. Conclusion 
Climate change is one of the most pressing, but also one of the most 
divisive, problems facing the world today. It is hardly surprising that it 
should threaten to create very divisive problems in the WTO. It is 
sometimes suggested that allowing unilateral emissions-based import 
restrictions might cause the collapse of the world trading system. And 
so it might. The converse possibility is not so often mentioned, but it also 
seems to me possible that, unless we achieve some multilateral solution 
to the climate change problem, trying to forbid unilateral emissions-
based import restrictions might also cause the collapse of the world 
trading system. A country that is doing its part to reduce emissions will 
not be content to purchase high-emissions products from countries that 
are not doing their part, thus damaging both its producers and the 
climate. If its import restrictions are held to be WTO illegal, it may be 
unwilling either to change its regulations or simply to swallow the 
sanctions, as the EU was willing to do for a time in connection with 
Hormones. If the trading system is endangered either way- and I fear it 
may be - trying to figure out the 'right' legal solution to the PPM 
problem may be a waste of time in this context. We must have a multi-
lateral climate agreement. But just in case it matters, I have tried to make 
it more likely that readers will think clearly about PPMs and get the right 
answers to the legal questions. 
